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Algis Mickûnas
Discursive Power
(Diskursyvioji galia)
Santrauka.  Ðiame straipsnyje glaustai nagrinëjami galios sampratos formavimosi ypatumai modernioje Vaka-
rø mokslo kultûroje. Teigiama, kad kitø tradicijø átraukimas á intelektinæ diskusijà suteikia pagrindà platesniam
ir gilesniam poþiûriui á diskursyviosios galios raiðkà ir politinës retorikos kilmæ.
Galios samprata neatsiejama nuo moderniøjø mokslø ir jø metodø kritikos, kuri baigiasi racionalumo krize.
Todël èia vadovaujamasi dviem intencionalumo kryptimis – vertikalia ir horizontalia, parodant, kad modernusis
mokslinis racionalumas átvirtina principus, kurie atmeta vertikalumà. Teigiama, kad mokslinë matematinio
metodo koncepcija, kaip bûdas konstruoti medþiaginá pasaulá, teikia kalbiniø þenklø sistemø suvarþymo pavyzdá.
Kad ir nesàmoningai, moderniosios filosofijos ir mokslo formos „iðskliaudþia“ kalbinës raiðkos formas suteikda-
mos pirmenybæ specifinei kalbai.
Ðio straipsnio paskirtis – atskleisti specifinius darinius, kurie lyg ir niekam nepriklauso, taèiau jie sudaro
moderniojo supratimo modalumus. Modernioji galios samprata remiasi savita duotybës sandara, pateikiama
kaip transcendencija, kuri yra neprieinama tiesioginei intuicijai. Modernusis filosofinis ir mokslinis màstymas
teigia, kad matematika, ar kiekybinës procedûros, yra ne tik metodologinës gairës, bet pagrindþia teoriná màsty-
mà. Specifinë tokiø procedûrø sandara rodo, kad jos apima struktûras ir taisykles, kurios gali bûti formuluojamos
neatsiþvelgiant á santyká su intuityvia, t.y. kokybine, tiesioginio suvokimo sritimi.
Kad ðios procedûros ir struktûros ágytø pagrástumà, remiantis ðiomis procedûromis, turi bûti sukurtas objek-
tyvus pasaulis. Pirma, procedûros turi bûti indiferentiðkos suvokimo intuicijos atþvilgiu; jos perteikia visus ávykius
kaip ið esmës homogeniðkus. Antra, pagal ðiuos reikalavimus – teoriðkai-metodologiðkai reikalaujamo homoge-
niðkumo vardu – apibrëþiama intuicijos, tiesiogiai duotos suvokimui, sritis. Moderniojo amþiaus màstytojai,
siekdami rasti vietà formaliai srièiai, iðranda „talpyklà“, pavadindami jà protu. Èia tariamai gyvena minëti
kiekybiniai ir formalûs komponentai, kurie priklauso subjekto imanencijai.
Postmodernioji semiotika daro prielaidà, kad, viena vertus, nëra „vietø“, kuriose ásikûrusi galia, taèiau, kita
vertus, ji visur ir visada ágyvendinama pasitelkiant diskursà. Nors tokia prielaida yra tinkama, vis dëlto svarbu
suprasti pagrindþiamuosius galios suvokimo principus. Kaip árodinëja Edmundas Husserlis, technologizacija
numato formalias operacijas, visiðkai nepaisydama gyvenamojo pasaulio prasmës struktûrø. Toks formalizmas,
suporuotas su homogeniðka ir indiferentiðka tikrove, galiausiai baigiasi dviem struktûriniais procesais. Pirma,
visiðkai nepaisoma konkreèiø gyvenamojo pasaulio prasmiø ir jø horizontø, o antra, formalûs ir technologiniai
principai atsiejami nuo konkreèiø intencionalumo formø, kurios susieja subjektà su gyvenamojo pasaulio mor-
fologijomis.
Kultûra gali stiprinti savo ðeimininkavimà ir praktinæ kontrolæ plësdama formaliosios diferenciacijos þymenis
ir technologiná aplinkos suvarþymà, stiprindama materialiøjø iðtekliø vartojimo efektyvumà. Taèiau tai – krizës
pagrindas, nes mokslas átraukiamas á þmoniø gyvenimà remiantis technologiniu materialiøjø iðtekliø „vartojimu“,
ágyvendinant tas paèias operacijas, kaip ir gamtos pasaulio atþvilgiu.
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The phenomenon of power is implicit in
numerous critiques of modern sciences and their
methods, resulting in the crisis of rationality.
Our analyses will follow two intentionalities, the
vertical and the horizontal, showing that the
modern scientific rationality assumes principles
which exclude the vertical. By “intentionality”
we mean a way of experiencing the world at the
exclusion of other ways. Thus, intentionality is
not a private affair but can be carried from gen-
eration to generations. For example, scientists
invariably will say “let us look at the world math-
ematically,” proposing a quantitative mode of
perception over poetic, ritualistic, etc. The lat-
ter, while equally intentional, will be discarded
by science.
Thus the scientific conception of math-
ematical method, as a way of mastering the
material world, intimates also a restriction of
linguistic sign systems and uses to specific
modes, mathematical discourse, at the expense
and exclusion of other discursive forms. If not
deliberate, there is a specific “bracketing” that
was performed by the philosophies and sciences
of the modern age that allotted the primacy of
all understanding to language, and indeed to a
specific language. The result of this develop-
ment is manifested in the current claims by the
semiotics and the deconstructionists that lan-
guage or discourse is the primary power in all
domains of human experience and praxis. While
at first sight outlandish, this claim is well justi-
fied on the basis of most concrete analyses of
modernity, with its ontology and scientific
method.
Our approach will trace out this “bracket-
ing” and show what phenomena become dis-
carded and what phenomena remain in order
to be constitutive of power. It is hoped that the
result of this investigation will reveal specific
formations which belong to no one, are nowhere,
and yet comprise the very modalities of our
modern awareness. What is meant here by
awareness consists of specific noetic practices
ruled by, and expressive of, a set of inten-
tionalities. In addition, the noetic practices con-
stitutive of power are also ruled by a specific form
of transcendence lending such practices their
autonomy. The latter is expressed in numerous
ways across various socio-political, economic and
scientific formations, aims, and imageries. It lends
an appearance of a total transcendental arbitrari-
ness to the noetic practices at all levels. The
phrase “noetic practices” encompasses what the
human actually does in relationship to the world
of objects of whatever type and at whatever level
of posited objectivity.
The given
The emergence of modern understanding
of power rests on a specific constitution of the
given seen as transcendence and inaccessible to
direct intuition. The configuration of the given
requires a precise deformation of qualitative
awareness, its bracketing and hence its reduc-
tion to the immanence of the subject. This im-
manence is subsequently designated in terms of
psychology and physiology (Dennet 2004).
This form of bracketing can be called the
Cartesian skepsis. As is well known, the modern
revolution deems reality to be a material exten-
sion of atomic parts that are not accessible to
experience, although manageable by a method
of mathematical manipulation. Following this,
the entire modern view claims that what is be-
yond skepsis is a constitution of a precise re-
flective method offering univocal and indiffer-
ent approach to a specifically constituted ob-
jectivity.
This is to say, the endless totality consists
of an univocal rationality correlative to the pre-
cise requirements of methodology. There is a
need to show the ways in which both, the meth-
odology, and the objectivity are constituted and
correlated. Invariably, modern philosophical and
scientific thinking grants that mathematics or
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quantitative procedures are not only as meth-
odological, but founding for all theoretical
thought. The specific composition of such pro-
cedures suggests that no intuitive content is
correlated to them. They contain structures and
rules which can be formulated without any re-
lation to the intuitive, i.e. qualitative and cat-
egorically articulated domain of direct aware-
ness. Moreover, any meaning such structures
acquire is not dictated by these structures. This
is to say, the meaning is a matter of will, but in
such a way that the will is not compelled by such
structures; they have no causal force. The im-
plications of such non-necessary connections will
be seen subsequently.
In order for these procedures and structures
to gain validity, the objective world must be
constituted in accordance with these proce-
dures. First, the procedures are indifferent with
respect to perceptual intuition; they treat all
events as if they were essentially homogeneous.
Second, the perceptual domain of intuition,
directly present to live awareness, is transcended
in favor of theoretically-methodologically re-
quired homogeneity, i.e. posited in accordance
with such requirements.
Obviously, the transcendence in this con-
text is minimally double: first, it is the transcen-
dence to consciousness of the qualitative sphere,
and second, the transcendence of the posited
homogeneous world subtending the qualitative.
In this sense, awareness has no access to the
second transcendence apart from the theoreti-
cal and methodological positing of reality. This
is the source of the Husserlian conception of
mathematically idealized nature whereby nature
becomes a homogeneous mathematical mani-
fold (Husserl 1962, 21–32).
We should not be misled by the concept of
homogeneity. The latter might seem to have
geometric associations, and hence capable of
being given in perceptual intuition; the prob-
lem lies in the practice of substituting geomet-
ric formations, the translation of the forms into
a mathematical set of signs which do not offer
any semblance or intuitive comparison to the
geometric domain (Ströker 1960).
The geometric understanding would still
offer a field posited as matter, yet with math-
ematization of geometry, and if one were to take
a next step toward formalization of mathemat-
ics, one would be able to regard the geometric
as quanta, as numerical points, sums, and divi-
sions, arranged in accordance with formal struc-
tures. Irrespective of the levels of quantita-
tive-formal constitution, there is posited only
one fundamental-transcendent reality. The
problems of the constitutive processes both of
the theoretical-methodological domain, and the
transcendent domain, lead to a particular con-
tradiction which cannot be solved within the
parameters of the theoretical-methodological
form.
The method is proclaimed to be universal,
all-inclusive, and thus able to subsume all phe-
nomena objectively. In this sense, the subject
who calculates, and formalizes must be either
subsumed under the method, or be the condi-
tion for the constitution of the method. If the
former thesis is accepted, then the method must
assume a position of supremacy over the sub-
ject, i.e. be objective; yet this very method per-
mits only one kind of reality: homogeneous
matter. The method is not “matter” but “ideal-
ity” and indeed a necessary ideality. And yet, if
the latter is taken for granted, i.e. that the sub-
ject too is to be submitted under the method,
then the ideality of the method has no place in
the subject, since the subject must be contingent
and thus cannot be a basis for the methodologi-
cal mathematical and formal necessities.In either
case, the theoretical-methodological composi-
tion is something other than the posited tran-
scendent reality, and the latter is not something
given. In fact, the morphologically constituted
and directly given world, a world of shapes, path-
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ways, axes for practical activity, multi-leveled
interconnections, is regarded as complex phe-
nomena that are not identical with the strict
homogeneous reality. This non-identity pre-
cludes the possibility of deriving the theoreti-
cal-methodological formations from the phe-
nomenal-morphological composition of what
Husserl called the lived world (Husserl 1962
114ff).
As a result, the former are neither correla-
tive to the intuited world of morphologically
composed things and their interconnections,
inclusive of the “real” subject, nor are they
abstractable from the posited homogeneous
world. On these terms, the transcendent world,
the world of theoretical objectivity, is not given
and cannot be a source of theoretical-metho-
dological compositions. The morphological world
is GIVEN, and yet it too is not a source for the
understanding of the transcendent world, and
neither can account for the theory and method
of the modern sciences and the positing of the
world of transcendent and perceptually inac-
cessible homogeneous world. And yet, the
theoretical-methodological composition is re-
garded as GIVEN, and indeed with full eviden-
tial necessity.
What kind of necessity? Purely quantita-
tive and formal structures having their own rules
and procedures, where the morphological or the
material side is completely contingent and ar-
bitrary. With respect to the rules of the formal
domain, the morphological and intuitive side,
such as sounds or marks, is arbitrarily selectable
and changeable. This is one of the more funda-
mental and initial designations of the formal as
necessary and the material as arbitrary. This sug-
gests that the connection between them is not
direct, not immediate or GIVEN, but must be
INTENDED by an entirely different act. While
there are many acts which can comprise the con-
nection, modern thought requires a specific act
that is constitutive of power. Such an act has to
be deciphered in its own right. Here we are con-
cerned with the conjunction between the domains
which are radically distinct: the theoretical-metho-
dological and the transcendent. To repeat, the
former is regarded as necessary and GIVEN,
while the latter is regarded as transcendent,
contingent and NOT GIVEN.
Formal Region
As already noted, the theoretical-metho-
dological, or termed otherwise, the quanti-
tative-formal, are not within the domains of the
contingent world, posited as transcendent. It is
not found even in the directly intuited morpho-
logical composition of the lived world. It is re-
garded as different from these domains. Not
having any other locus for the formal, the think-
ers of the modern age invented a container
called “mind” in which these quantitative and
formal components reside. They belong to the
immanence of the subject.
The immanence assumes an ambiguous sta-
tus: it is the container of the theoretical-metho-
dological formal necessities, and yet it is factu-
ally a contingent, material substance. This con-
tingency is expressed by Cartesianism in two
ways: first, the formal composition, with respect
to a posited absolute being, cannot be regarded
as necessary. This is to say, the absolute being
can will different formal systems; this is an ana-
logical expression of a conception which offers
an initial indication as to the arbitrariness of
the formal. Second, the formal is seen as ca-
pable of continuous analyses; any break in the
analyses is a matter of decision. In this sense,
the formal domain swings in the ambiguity be-
tween necessity and will, rules and choice.
The importance of this “indecision” con-
sists precisely in the option to either regard the
formal as a priori given or as a construct of the
subject. Various expressions are offered at the
dawn of the modern age to indicate the shift
toward the latter option. The notions of na-
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ture as created in accordance with mathemati-
cal laws comprise one expression. Coupled with
the notion that even the mathematical-formal
is decidable by an absolute will, the result is
obvious: the stress is on the primacy of construc-
tion of the formal systems. They too are cho-
sen, although they cannot be regarded as con-
tingent in the sense of the contingency of the
transcendent world. Their emergence requires
unique intentions that have to be regarded as
capable of formal construction and of arbitrary
signification. Moreover, such intentionalities
must include the possibility of extending and
proliferating formal compositions and divisions
at will, and of disregarding the perceptual, in-
tuitive content.
A brief analysis of this disregard will clarify
the constructive intentionality, necessary for the
understanding of the composition of power in
the modern age at the level of signs. To note,
while the conception of homogeneity of the
transcendent reality can be described by geo-
metrical structures, corresponding to the mor-
phological and perceptually intuited world, the
shift from the geometrical signification to the
mathematical and formal abandons any kind of
intuitive correspondence between the shapes of
geometry and the morphological compositions
of the lived world.
Hence, any theory of representative corre-
spondence, copy of the world in the “mind”
substance, has to be abandoned. The signitive
symbolism of quantitative and formal composi-
tions do not offer any intuitive counterpart in
the perceptual world apart from the sounds or
marks, selected arbitrarily. But these marks,
while part of the morphological world, in no
wise resemble the theoretical-methodological
composition; they simply provide the arbitrary
means for perceptual expression. Although
there are many complexities in the constitution
of the quantitative-formal modes of theore-
tical-methodological thought, in principle this
thought does not offer any possibility of corre-
spondence between theoretical- methodologi-
cal compositions and the perceptual world of
shapes and structures.
The operations with signified symbolism -
the perceptual side of the quantitative-formal
- offer themselves in a precise order: they must
be arranged sequentially and uni-directionally.
They must follow a temporal sequence and must
be constructed as sequential. The perceptual
intuition into the morphological side of such
signitive processes offers an awareness of “pro-
gression” from a starting point to a finish. The
problem of the finish is not to be taken in a
finite sense: the formal procedures lend them-
selves to indefinite progression and articulation;
hence what could be regarded as finish is a de-
cision to stop the formal articulation of theore-
tical-methodological composition. As noted
above, the quantitative and formal processes can
be continued indefinitely; any cessation in our
operations with them, as was already noted at
the dawn of the modern age, is a matter of
choice.
Phenomenologically speaking, there ap-
pears a specific “lack” on the basis of the trans-
formation from the morphological lived world,
present to perceptual awareness, to the formal
signitive symbolisms, expressed serially by arbi-
trary selected marks. The intentional direction
toward the perceptual world, capturing the
morphological constitution of the lived world,
can be designated as VERTICAL. The mainte-
nance of the vertical intentionality requires the
presence and continuity of the directly intuited
morphology; this intuition can be unfolded
horizontally, and if need be in a horizontal per-
formances composed of grammatically struc-
tured marks or sounds.
Thus the morphological awareness of a par-
ticular object can offer a possibility of eidetic
variation to yield a pure geometric figure,
whereby the morphological awareness becomes
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an intuitive exemplification of a corresponding
eidetic structure. Each morphological variant
has a representing capacity, i.e. it can give an
intuitive similarity to the eidetic structure, held
by vertical intentionality. Yet the constitution of
the mathematical-formal need no longer signify
the object present to vertical intentionality. It
becomes free from any morphological moorings
and vertical intentionality and can be articulated
on the basis of its own formal procedures. This is
to say, it can “progress” uni-directionally, i.e.
HORIZONTALLY in a process of either in-
creased formally analytic differentiations or an
indefinite repetition of functions.
The specificity of this horizontal process
consists of the fact that the criteria of articula-
tion, differentiation, and analyses are intrinsic
to the formal discourses. This is quite fitting,
since the criteria of the experienced world, the
given morphological structures are no longer
signified by the formal processes. After all, what
the formal process signifies is its own arbitrary
selection of means of expression. The formal
can be still regarded as necessary and the se-
lected expressive “material” as contingent (al-
though with the previously mentioned ambigu-
ity), yet what leads the process is the possibility
of increased formalization of propositions, re-
sulting in the concept of formal systems which
can be differentiated into formal sub-systems
and of splitting up of systems into distinct for-
mal systems. Disregarding the morphological
composition of the lived world, this process pre-
tends to subsume under itself all domains of
the world not on the basis of any intuitive con-
tent but on the basis of formal designations and
differentiations.
Contingency
The previously indicated problematic of the
transcendent world emerges here in a new guise.
The excluded morphological lived world yields,
in accordance with formal systems, no visible
necessity. The posited homogeneous world,
transcending all perceptual and intuitive access
does not offer any viable view which would make
its necessity present. This is to say, it too must
be regarded as contingent. Being inaccessible,
it must be posited in accordance with the for-
mal definitions and procedures whose necessity
would provide a MODEL of explanation not
for the perceptual components, but of POS-
SIBLE PROCESSES DESIGNATED AS MA-
TERIAL.
The contingent is so designated because its
necessity comes from another, and in two senses.
First, from the formal articulations comprising
the theoretical-methodological domain pre-
sumed to be correlative to the posited transcen-
dent reality, and second, from a presumed act
of an absolute creation (Galileo) such that the
theoretical-methodological composition is the
very way in which reality is created (Schabert
1978;193ff). This is the symbolic support desig-
nated to necessitate the functioning of this re-
ality and to guarantee that our theoreti-
cal-methodological forms constitute adequate
descriptions of reality. Thus the Galilean excla-
mation of our greatness (ibid 141ff).
Analogous symbolic ploy was used by
Descartes to guarantee the necessity of the ob-
jective phenomena. This persistent insistence on
securing symbolic assurances for necessity of the
processes of the transcendent reality indicates
a fundamental realization that left to itself such
a reality is contingent, unless it acquires its ne-
cessity from elsewhere. This is to say that an
appeal to an absolute geometrician is not an
attempt to placate the ecclesiastics, but a sym-
bolic effort to legitimate the necessity of an
otherwise contingently construed reality and the
correlative necessity of the presumed objective
theory and method.
If we were to exclude such a symbolism, we
would be left with a contingent reality whose
necessity would come from another and this is
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to say from the theoretical-methodology. Con-
tingency excludes, at the same time essential-
ity, i.e. the possibility for a vertical intentional-
ity to maintain something permanent with nec-
essary characteristics, accessible to perception,
or in case of induction, essentiality with univer-
sal validity in the sphere of ontology. The abo-
lition of essentiality (the Greek notion of es-
sential composition of something real) opens
the door to the notion of an access to this real-
ity in terms of POSSIBILITY. This is to say,
since what IS cannot be perceived, and since its
being posited as transcendent reality does not
offer any necessity for its composition, then it
can be accessed and dealt with in accordance
with theoretical-methodological formal possi-
bilities. This is precisely the juncture at which it
becomes “necessary” to regard this transcendent
reality in accordance with what it can possibly
be. Before continuing this line of constitution,
it is advisable to interject the first moment which
offers itself through the awareness delimited
until now.
Power
The problems of power have been discussed
from ancient Far East all the way to modern
political thought and even post modern
semiotics. The last has admitted that power is
not to be located anywhere, although its exer-
cise is present everywhere through discourse.
Such an admission is well taken, but without a
proper grounding in awareness. The task at
hand is to indicate what grounds power in
awareness and why it cannot be located. To re-
call the previous discussion and its basic com-
position: the lived world of morphologically
constituted and intuitively accessible events and
objects is bracketed under scientific skepsis; the
posited transcendent and homogeneous reality
is inaccessible to perception.
The constitution of the theoretical-metho-
dological formalisms have no intuitive counter-
part, i.e no vertical hold. They can be articu-
lated horizontally in a serial, unilinear progres-
sion in accordance with their own intrinsic rules.
The homogeneous transcendent reality is con-
tingent and hence open to POSSIBILITY. As
a result, there is no necessary connection be-
tween the theoretical-methodological formal-
isms, or their signitive functions, and the tran-
scendent reality. The connection is arbitrary.
This is to say, it requires a specific intentional-
ity which is not necessitated by any real com-
pulsion or law to connect the formal signitive
factors to the posited reality.
The arbitrariness appears under various
guises: the “application” of theory to “praxis,”
the most lyrically stressed intoxication that the
purpose of all science is a reshaping of the en-
vironment in accordance with human designs,
the humanistic efforts to “humanize” nature and
the “human animal,” the aims at improving
nature, the fascinating pronouncements that if
god is dead, then everything is permitted, the
exclamations that something is good because we
say it is good in accordance with our own pre-
scripts, etc. In principle, the intentional con-
nection between the formally constituted do-
main and the posited reality has no hold in any-
thing, and it need not respect any prescription
and qualitative composition of the lived world.
And yet it is a required nexus between the theo-
retical and the real. After all, the signitive for-
mal compositions do not point to anything that
would be intuitively similar to such compositions.
Arbitrary selection of formal components for
possible correlation to the homogeneous quan-
tified world offers no other option apart from
the imposition of the formally constituted meth-
ods on the real.
While this might seem obvious, there ap-
pears an unnoticed requirement for this corre-
lation: concrete activity. The formal composi-
tions, not having any similarity to anything in-
tuitively present to perception, cannot be cor-
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related to anything perceptual; hence by exclud-
ing the perceptual, the correlation requires an
active intervention and construction of the pos-
ited homogeneous world in accordance with the
formal requirements. In this sense, the formal
requirements comprise POSSIBILIZING ar-
rangements which direct the construction of the
real in accordance with formal requirements.
This is to say the intention to control the envi-
ronment under whatever guise is not a power
aim of Bacon, Descartes, Galileo, Buffon, the
capitalists or the Marxists, but the constitution
of the possibility of arbitrariness in the connec-
tion between theory and “reality.”
Arbitrariness, as a ground for power, might
run counter to the usual notions that only set
restrictions comprise power, e.g. discursive prac-
tices of a tradition. Indeed, it is possible to ex-
tend the argument that the classical conceptions
of human nature and essence, and indeed an
essence of everything else, submitted nature to
power under the guise of limits, restrictions and
impositions; yet such restrictions were not ex-
ternal but comprised the very way of being with-
out violation. It could be argued that a con-
tinuous or at least somewhat stable framework
restricts activities and disallows violations “with-
out notice.” Yet arbitrariness lends itself to an
emergence of power without reason, or at best
from psychological whim, enhanced, prompted,
and fed by unlimited possibilities of formal and
as a result material constructions.
The intentionality emerging here between
the theoretical and the real swings between two
possibilizing structures: the formal possibilities,
operating purely with arbitrarily selected signs,
reach a point of realization that the formal pro-
cesses are also arbitrarily constructed and hence
can be reconstructed at will, purely empty sig-
nifications without any immediate fulfillment
in perceptual intuition. These formally designed
possibilities are also in a position to align the
transcendent reality toward intuitive fulfillment
by human intervention into the processes of the
lived world and, by disregarding the given per-
ceptual morphologies of that world, to shape
the presumed underlying homogeneous matter
toward material possibilities in accord with the
formal designs.
This shaping comprises the source of both,
the labor theory of value and life - the primacy
of homo laborans – and technology, inclusive
of the appearance of political technocracies
which promise to redesign the environment and
the human in line with the theoretical-metho-
dological requirements: a world produced by
science. Some scholars in fact suggest that the
modern world has two intentional histories: one,
a completely unstructured world of completely
autonomous individuals, and two, a complete
redesigning of the world in accordance with the
formal designs we ourselves posit. Yet in either
case arbitrariness is assumed and the intention-
ality that swings between the formal and the
transcendent is the decisive arbitrator.
This intentionality is not identical with
Kantian autonomous will and with Nietzsche’s
will to power. Its engagement is with possibili-
zing constituents both at the formal and at the
material levels. The possibilizing allows for for-
mal variations and differentiations of processes
into systems and sub-systems, until the sub-sys-
tems can become “distinct” sciences, carving out
their fields and accessing the environment in
accordance with their formal requirements. This
simply means an increased refinement of “ap-
plication” and fulfillment of the formal sphere
in the material sphere. This is the technologi-
cal process.
As Husserl argues, technologization posits
formal operations, with a total disregard or in-
difference to the meaning and truth of nature
in the lived world. Such formalism, coupled with
the presumed homogeneous and indifferent
reality, results in two structural processes when
introduced in the lived world. First, a complete
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disregard to the concrete meanings and their
horizons, including their enactments in the lived
world thus leading to increased contingency, and
second, formal and technological detachment
from the concrete intentionalities which tie the
subject to the morphologies of the lived world.
These two components constitute the
problematics of the relationship between con-
tingency, detachment, and nature. Both, the
formally designed systems and the transcendent
material nature, comprise a detachment from
the lived world and allow an arbitrary correla-
tion between them. One can treat everything
from a vantage point of detached formalism and
regard qualitative and essential distinctions with
indifference.
As already suggested, the formal indiffer-
ent and disconnected constitution lends itself
to a horizontal process of increased formaliza-
tion of all propositions in such a way that there
emerge increased formal differentiations of for-
mal systems. While leading to more complex
formal connections, it also includes increased
differentiations. In this sense, the material re-
ality can be increasingly differentiated and con-
structed along more complex and yet more dis-
tinct technical masteries and controls of the
material. The increase of formal complexities
and differences is coextensive with an increase
in the contingency of the material processes,
leading to more possible rearrangements of the
indifferent material nature. As Jonas suggests,
every refined and produced material process
offers possibilities for further formal refine-
ments and material rearrangements (Jonas 1981;
73–96).
The horizontal differentiation of formal
systems and their correlative material struc-
turation, provide a basis for disciplinary differ-
entiations, each having its own formal ap-
proaches and each capable of possible construc-
tion of material fulfillment. While this process
maintains its basic principles of formal and ma-
terial detachments, it “progresses” toward a dif-
ferentiated inclusion of all events, both “natu-
ral” and cultural, and thus constitutes a for-
mally differentiated world where semi-in-
dependent spheres call for semi-independent
functions and “work.” What is relevant in hu-
man life depends and is contingent upon the
manner in which the formal constructs divide
the human “material:” the human is economic,
social, chemical, physiological, psychological,
biological, etc. set of differentiated “behaviors,”
each semi independent of the others.
It would be redundant to analyze the obvi-
ous: the “power” of these differentiations com-
prises also the separations of social functions
and tasks, leading to a society of semi-inde-
pendent groupings of expertise. Yet what each
expertise produces within its own sphere has no
necessary connection with other spheres. Hence
the results of “research” in a specific domain,
can be picked up by military or by art. For the
experts of each domain there is no recourse to
any external criterion concerning the inten-
tionalities which would correlate the results as
possibilities in another domain. This is to say,
the material, i.e. technically produced forces can
be selected at will, arbitrarily by other social
domains, such as politics for possible applica-
tion. The lateral differentiation decentralizes
responsibility, thus increasing the contingency
and arbitrariness, and the latter is increasingly
unchained from any constraints.
Every formal rule, and every material re-
sult made to fulfill the formal design, become
totally arbitrary, offering possibilizing formal
and material combinations without end. Each
domain is released from the concrete lived world
implications, each an expert in its own sphere,
need not relate to any other sphere; each can
claim that there is no such thing as conclusive
evidence precisely because the formal systems
and their fulfilled material arrangements are
arbitrary designs and carry no necessity; they are,
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insofar as they make, and with the making they
assume reality and hence increment power and
“prove” their momentary success.
It would be redundant to speak of inher-
ent needs since the latter are part and parcel of
the possibilizing procedures and become at the
same time needs and fulfillment. We can make
it, therefore we want it, and we wanted there-
fore we can make it. What this suggests is that
the process of increased contingency and arbi-
trariness as eidos of power, comprises a self-re-
ferential domain. This means that there are no
restrictions for the “search for truth.” After all,
such a search has lost any boundary and any
distinction between knowledge and object.
Even in social understanding, the relation-
ship between the formal and material processes
are determined by science, i.e. the very self ar-
ticulation and production. One, thus, cannot find
any trans-scientific criteria to check this process.
And each domain has no built in reason to stop
the proliferation of its own form of knowledge
and praxis. There are no physical reasons to cease
making more physical experiments and refine-
ments, no economic reasons to stop the economic
growth, no biological reasons to stop remolding
of the living processes along new combinations,
etc. Any limitation would be regarded as an in-
fringement on the autonomy of research. Any
science, which would proclaim that it has become
complete, would cease to be a science in the con-
text depicted above.
Progress
Given the key intentionality which swings
without any essential necessitation between the
theoretical-methodological and the transcendent
homogeneous domains, there emerges the atten-
dant factor which is permanent: PROGRESS. It
must be without regression, without death, and
all formal systems and all transformations of the
lived world into calculatively remade world are
enhancements, maintenances of this permanent
structure. What is peculiar about progress is that
it has no “subject” that would progress. Its aim
and its subject is itself and thus it is self-re-
ferential. Progress is its own destiny. It consti-
tutes its own increasing formal refinements, ef-
ficiencies and improvements without, of course,
attaining perfection. No attained construction
is left without possibilizing and hence improve-
ment. In this sense one could say semiotically,
and yet on Husserlian basis, that the signifier
and the signified, the meaning and the meant,
are one.
The question that arises in this kind of
progress, and as pointed out, its proliferation
of increasing arbitrariness with respect to all
phenomena, is the appearance of crisis. What
is immediately notable is the disproportion be-
tween the sub-system called science and the rest
of the culture. The efforts by the theore-
tically-methodologically designed systems to
master the material nature has become expo-
nential. Let us be clear about this: there can be
only one domain of progress, and this is the
coded and formalized transmission of practices,
techniques, or strategies. A culture can increase
its mastery and practical control through the
increase of formal differentiations and physical
interventions in the environment, yet it cannot
increase what the environment as a whole has
to offer.
There is no progress in nature. We cannot
increase material resources, but only the effi-
ciency of their uses. Only the latter can progress.
And this is precisely the point of crisis: the sci-
ences are entering human life on the basis of
this “use” i.e. making humans function in ac-
cordance with the very prescripts that are im-
posed on the presumed physical world. Thus the
question: is this a progress for human life, or is
this the arbitrary treatment of the human and
hence the subsumption of the human under
arbitrariness and its opening up of power over
the human?
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Obviously, the use and interference is in-
herent in the processes of modern science, re-
quiring the intentionality which can connect the
formal and the material. The human then is
submitted to and subsumed under an arbitrari-
ness which includes his own operations. That
is, the human also functions in this modern in-
tentionality and treats, or at least is exposed in
principle to treat everything arbitrarily, i.e vio-
lently. Arbitrariness is a “power” which opens
an initial experience of violation. But this vio-
lation cannot be avoided within the context of
modern understanding of theory and method
and their “application.”
The brief discussion of the emergence of
power in the modern tradition resulted in sign
systems as all encompassing EIDOS of power.
Other traditions should be deciphered and
variations performed in order to discover the
complete noetic-noematic correlation constitut-
ing power. One notion seems to be warranted
in the context of our discussion: it is not the
discursive limits which exercise power – after all,
Greeks were capable of linguistic “dance” within
a well designed form – but an arbitrariness which
proclaims a homogeneity of a method and the
material world which then can disregard not only
the limits of qualitatively understood objects,
but also the uniqueness of any individual. Ar-
bitrary violation of limits is what will yield mod-
ern power. This now can open our understand-
ing to political rhetoric and its power to make,
and a broader grasp of the basis of discursive
power.
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